2020年5G移動技術對國家安全的影響 -美國國會研究服務局（英文版）（3頁）.pdf

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1、 https:/crsreports.congress.gov Updated June 4, 2020 National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn

2、enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G technologies are expected to support interconnected or autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial machinery, and advanced robotics. 5G for the military could additionally improve inte

3、lligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processing; enable new methods of command and control (C2); and streamline logistics systems for increased efficiency, among other uses. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed, Congress may consider policies for spectrum management

4、and national security, as well as implications for U.S. military operations. Spectrum Management 5G technologies plan to use three segments of the electromagnetic spectrum (“the spectrum”): high band (also called millimeter wave, or MMW), which operates between around 24 and 300 GHz; mid band, which

5、 operates between 1 GHz and 6 GHz; and low band, which operates below 1 GHz. Mid band and low band are often collectively referred to as sub-6 (see Figure 1). Figure 1. 5G Proposed Spectrum Source: https:/media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/03/2002109302/-1/-1/0/ DIB_5G_STUDY_04.03.19.PDF. Millimeter waves a

6、llow faster data transfer rates, which some telecommunications companies argue is required for autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, and other data- intensive applications like smart cities; however, MMW travel comparatively short distances and can be absorbed by rain or disrupted by physical object

7、s such as buildings and vehicles. As a result, 5G MMW technologies require installing a higher number of cell sitesat much higher cost and on a much slower deployment timeline than the sub-6 approach. 5G deployment thus relies on MMW for high-speed, high-bandwidth communications and on sub-6 waves f

8、or nationwide coverage. Telecommunication companies around the world are deploying 5G in different ways. Chinese telecommunications companies are focusing on the less expensive sub-6 approach, while some U.S. telecommunication providers are focused on MMW deployments and others on sub-6. The Departm

9、ent of Defense (DOD), however, holds large portions of the usable spectrum. Although DOD uses certain MMW frequencies for high-profile military applications such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites that provide assured global communications for U.S. forces, it extensively uses sub-6 freq

10、uenciesleaving less sub-6 availability in the United States than in other countries. The Defense Innovation Board (DIB) advised DOD to consider sharing sub-6 spectrum to facilitate the build-out of 5G networks and the development of 5G technologies used in the sub-6 band. While DOD has been moving t

11、oward greater spectrum sharing, it has expressed concern that sharing presents operational, interference, and security issues for DOD users. As an alternative to spectrum sharing, some analysts have argued that portions of the sub-6 spectrum should be reserved for commercial use. This would require

12、DOD to relocate certain applications to other parts of the spectrum. The DIB estimates this approach would take around 10 years to complete, as opposed to 5 years for spectrum sharing. National Security Concerns According to a DIB assessment, China is the current leader in sub-6 technologies and is

13、likely to deploy the worlds first 5G wide-area network. Chinese companies, which often receive government subsidies (e.g., subsidized land for facilities, R Hill Air Force Base, UT (“spectrum sharing between 5G and airborne radar”); Joint Base Lewis- McChord, WA (“augmented and virtual reality”); Ne

14、llis Air Force Base, NV (“survivable command and control and network enhancement”); Naval Base Norfolk, VA (“ship- wide and pier connectivity”); Joint Base Pearl Harbor- Hickam, HI (“enhancing aircraft mission readiness”); Joint Base San Antonio, TX (“augmented reality support of maintenance and tra

15、ining”); Tinker Air Force Base, OK (“spectrum sharing between military communications and 5G”); Camp Pendleton, CA (unspecified application); and Ft. Hood, TX, and the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA (“connectivity for forward operating bases and tactical operations centers”). The Departme

16、nt requested $1.5 billion for 5G and microelectronics in FY2021. Potential Questions for Congress What approach to spectrum management (e.g., spectrum sharing, spectrum reallocation) will best protect DOD missions while meeting growing commercial demands? What are the risks to U.S. national security

17、 posed by Chinese 5G infrastructure in allied and partner nations? Can that risk be managed and, if so, how? Should the United States limit intelligence sharing with countries operating Chinese-supplied 5G equipment? Are any changes to operational concepts, force structure, doctrine, or posture requ

18、ired as a result of developments in or applications of military 5G? John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and Programs Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and Global Security IF11251 National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies https:/crsreports.

19、congress.gov | IF11251 VERSION 11 UPDATED Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Informatio

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