安全世界基金會：2024年全球太空對抗能力報告（英文版）（286頁）.pdf

《安全世界基金會：2024年全球太空對抗能力報告（英文版）（286頁）.pdf》由會員分享，可在線閱讀，更多相關《安全世界基金會：2024年全球太空對抗能力報告（英文版）（286頁）.pdf（286頁珍藏版）》請在三個皮匠報告上搜索。

1、 G L O B A LC O U N TE R S P A C E C A P A BI L I T I E S An Open Source Assessment04 2024iGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES A B O U TS E C U R E W O R L DF O U N D AT I O NSecure World Foundation(SWF)is a private operating foundation that promotes cooperative solutions for space sustainability and t

2、he peaceful uses of outer space.The mission of the Secure World Foundation is to work with governments,industry,international organizations,and civil society to develop and promote ideas and actions to achieve the secure,sustainable,and peaceful uses of outer space benefiting Earth and all its peopl

3、es.Global Counterspace Capabilities 2024 by Secure World Foundation is licensed under Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International.To view a copy of this license,visit http:/creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0iiSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024Dr.Brian Weeden is the Chief Program Officer for Secure

4、World Foundation and has more than two decades of professional experience in space operations and policy.Dr.Weeden directs strategic planning for future-year projects to meet the Foundations goals and objectives,and conducts research on space debris,global space situational awareness,space traffic m

5、anagement,protectionof space assets,and space governance.Dr.Weeden also organizes national and international workshops to increase awareness of and facilitate dialogue on space security,stability,and sustainability topics.He is a member and former Chair of the World Economic Forums Global Future Cou

6、ncil on Space Technologies,a former member of the Advisory Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing(ACCRES)to the National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration(NOAA),and the Executive Director of the Consortium forExecution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations(CONFERS).Prior to joining SWF,Dr.Weede

7、n served nine years on active duty as an officer in the United States Air Force working in space and intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM)operations.As part of US Strategic Commands Joint Space Operations Center(JSpOC),Dr.Weeden directed the orbital analyst training program and developed tactics,

8、techniques and procedures for improving space situational awareness.Respected and recognized as an international expert,Dr.Weedens research and analysis have been featured in The New York Times,The Washington Post,National Public Radio,USA Today,The BBC,Fox News,China Radio International,The Economi

9、st,The World Economic Forums Annual Meeting in Davos,academic journals,presentations to the United Nations,and testimony before the US Congress.A BO U T T H EE DI T O RSDr.Brian Weeden Chief Program OfficeriiiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES Ms.Victoria Samson is the Chief Director,Space Security an

10、d Stability forSecure World Foundation and has over 25 years of experience in military space and security issues.Before joining SWF,Ms.Samson served as a Senior Analyst for the Center for Defense Information(CDI),where she leveraged her expertise in missile defense,nuclear reductions,and space secur

11、ity issues to conduct in-depth analysis and media commentary.Prior to her time at CDI,Ms.Samson wasthe Senior Policy Associate at the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers,a consortium of arms control groups in the Washington,D.C.area,where she worked with Congressional staffers,members of the media,e

12、mbassy officials,citizens,and think-tanks on issues surrounding dealing with national missile defense and nuclear weapons reductions.Before that,she was a researcher at Riverside Research Institute,where she worked on war-gaming scenarios for the Missile Defense Agencys Directorate of Intelligence.K

13、nown throughout the space and security arena as a thought leader on policy and budgetary issues,Ms.Samson is often interviewed by multinational media outlets,including The New York Times,Space News,The BBC,and NPR.She is also a prolific author of numerous op-eds,analytical pieces,journal articles,an

14、d updates on space security matters.She is also the head of the International Astronautical Federations task force on security and a member of the Space Security Working Group of the National Academies of Sciences,Engineering,and Medicines Committee on International Security and Arms Control.Ms.Vict

15、oria SamsonChief Director,Space Security and StabilityivSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024T A B L E O FC O N T E N T SSECTION 1 COUNTRIES THAT HAVE CONDUCTED DESTRUCTIVE ASAT TESTS01.The United States.01-01 02.Russia.02-01 03.China.03-01 04.India.04-01 05.Orbital Debris Created by Destructive ASAT Test

16、ing.05-01 SECTION 2 COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTERSPACE TECHNOLOGIES06.Australia.06-01 07.France.07-01 08.Iran.08-01 09.Israel.09-01 10.Japan.10-01 11.North Korea.11-01 12.South Korea.12-01 13.The United Kingdom.13-01 SECTION 3 CYBER COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES14.Global Cyber Counterspace Capabilities.1

17、4-01 APPENDIX I HISTORICAL ANTI-SATELLITE TESTS IN SPACE.15-01APPENDIX II IMAGERY OF COUNTERSPACE RELATED FACILITIES.16-01 vGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES LIS TO F FIG U R ESFIGURE 1-1 MINOTAUR UPPER STAGE.01-03FIGURE 1-2 ORBITAL EXPRESS MISSION PLAN.01-04 FIGURE 1-3 X-37B OTV 7 HIGHLY ELLIPTICAL

18、ORBIT.01-06FIGURE 1-4 GSSAP SATELLITES.01-08 FIGURE 1-5 SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM GROUND TEST.01-13FIGURE 1-6 ASM-135 FLIGHT PROFILE.01-14 FIGURE 1-7 UPLINK VS.DOWNLINK JAMMING.01-19FIGURE 1-8 SPACE FORCE GUARDIAN IN FRONT OF A PAIR OF COUNTER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ANTENNAS.01-20FIGURE 2-1 MiG-3

19、1BM CARRYING A BUREVESTNIK LAUNCHER.02-08FIGURE 2-2 LUCH(OLYMP)ORBITAL HISTORY.02-13FIGURE 2-3 LUCH 2 ORBITAL HISTORY.02-14FIGURE 2-4 TEL-MOUNTED NUDOL.02-18 FIGURE 2-5 RUSSIAN COUNTERSPACE EW SYSTEMS.02-24FIGURE 2-6 KRASUKHA-4 .02-28 FIGURE 2-7 THE PERESVET LASER SYSTEM.02-31FIGURE 3-1 RPO/ROBOTIC

20、ARM DEMONSTRATOR SY-7.03-03FIGURE 3-2 LONGITUDINAL HISTORY OF THE SJ-17.03-07FIGURE 3-3 LONGITUDINAL HISTORY OF THE TJS-3.03-08 FIGURE 3-4 DF-21 MRBM.03-13FIGURE 3-5 XICHANG SPACE LAUNCH COMPLEX ON APRIL 3,2013.03-14FIGURE 4-1 MISSION SHAKTI ASAT.04-03 FIGURE 8-1 IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILES.08-04viSE

21、CURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024FIGURE 11-1 KWANGMYONGSONG-4.11-03FIGURE 16-1 FORT GREELY GBI FIELD.16-01FIGURE 16-2 VANDENBERG SPACE LAUNCH COMPLEX 6.16-02FIGURE 16-3 CAPE CANAVERAL X-37B HANGAR.16-03FIGURE 16-4 KAPUSTIN YAR MOBILE MISSILE LAUNCH SITE.16-04FIGURE 16-5 PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER MOBI

22、LE MISSILE LAUNCH COMPLEX.16-05FIGURE 16-6 PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SITE 133.16-06FIGURE 16-7 PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SITE 43.16-07FIGURE 16-8 PLESETSK AREA 141 BUREVESTNIK FACILITIES.16-08FIGURE 16-9 SARY SHAGAN ABM SILOS.16-09FIGURE 16-10 BAIKONUR COSMODROME SITE 90.16-10 FIGURE 16-11 JIU

23、QUAN SUBORBITAL LAUNCH COMPLEX.16-11FIGURE 16-12 KORLA WEST TEST COMPLEX.16-12 FIGURE 16-13 KORLA WEST LAUNCH PAD.16-13FIGURE 16-14 TAIYUAN SPACE LAUNCH CENTER MOBILE PAD.16-14FIGURE 16-15 WENCHANG SPACE LAUNCH CENTER.16-15FIGURE 16-16 XICHANG SPACE LAUNCH CENTER NORTH ASAT PAD.16-16FIGURE 16-17 XIC

24、HANG SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SOUTH ASAT PAD.16-17FIGURE 16-18 SATISH DHAWAN SPACE CENTRE.16-18FIGURE 16-19 ABDUL KALAM ISLAND LAUNCH COMPLEX.16-19FIGURE 16-20 SEMNAN SPACE CENTER.16-20FIGURE 16-21 SHAHRUD LAUNCH SITE.16-21FIGURE 16-22 TANEGASHIMA SPACE CENTER.16-22viiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES FIG

25、URE 16-23 TONGHAE SATELLITE LAUNCHING GROUND.16-23FIGURE 16-24 SOHAE SATELLITE LAUNCHING STATION.16-24 FIGURE 16-25 MIRACL LASER.16-25 FIGURE 16-26 PERESVET DEPLOYMENT SITE NEAR BARNAUL.16-26FIGURE 16-27 KALINA LASER COMPLEX NEAR ZELENCHUKSKAYA.16-27FIGURE 16-28 TOBOL ELECTRONIC WARFARE COMPLEX NEAR

26、 ULAN-UDE.16-28FIGURE 16-29 LASER TEST SITE NEAR MIANYANG.16-29 FIGURE 16-30 LASER TEST SITE NEAR BOHU.16-30FIGURE 16-31 CAPE COD MISSILE WARNING RADAR.16-31FIGURE 16-32 FYLINGDALES MISSILE WARNING RADAR.16-32FIGURE 16-33 EGLIN SPACE SURVEILLANCE RADAR.16-33FIGURE 16-34 KWAJALEIN S-BAND SPACE FENCE.

27、16-34FIGURE 16-35 LINCOLN SPACE SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX.16-35FIGURE 16-36 GLOBUS II RADAR.16-36FIGURE 16-37 REAGAN TEST SITE.16-37FIGURE 16-38 GEODSS DIEGO GARCIA.16-38FIGURE 16-39 HOLT C-BAND RADAR IN EXMOUTH.16-39FIGURE 16-40 SPACE SURVEILLANCE TELESCOPE IN EXMOUTH.16-40FIGURE 16-41 AIR FORCE MAUI OP

28、TICAL AND SUPERCOMPUTING OBSERVATORY.16-41FIGURE 16-42 VORONEZH RADAR AT ORSK.16-42FIGURE 16-43 DARYAL RADAR AT PECHORA.16-43FIGURE 16-44 DNEPR SITE RADAR AT SARY SHAGAN.16-44FIGURE 16-45 DON-2N SITE AT SOFRINO.16-45viiiSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024FIGURE 16-46 DUNAI-3M RADAR AT CHEKHOV.16-46FIGUR

29、E 16-47 RAZVYAZKA RADAR AT CHEKHOV.16-47FIGURE 16-48 KRONA COMPLEX NEAR STOROZHEVAYA.16-48FIGURE 16-49 30J6 COMPLEX NEAR STOROZHEVAYA.16-49FIGURE 16-50 OKNO COMPLEX NEAR NUREKE.16-50FIGURE 16-50 LPAR SITE NEAR KORLA.16-51FIGURE 16-52 PURPLE MOUNTAIN OBSERVATORY.16-52FIGURE 16-53 GRAVES RADAR TRANSMI

30、TTER.16-53FIGURE 16-54 GRAVES RADAR RECEIVER.16-54FIGURE 16-55 TAROT-CALERN TELESCOPE.16-55FIGURE 16-56 SWORDFISH RADAR NEAR GARHBANGOR.16-56 FIGURE 16-57 DELIJAN SPACE TRACKING CENTER.16-57FIGURE 16-58 BISEI SPACEGUARD CENTER.16-58FIGURE 16-59 KAMISAIBARA SPACEGUARD CENTER.16-59ixGLOBAL COUNTERSPAC

31、E CAPABILITIES LIS TO F TA B L ESTABLE 1-1 SATELLITES APPROACHED BY GSSAP THROUGH 2022.01-09TABLE 1-2 RECENT US RPOs.01-10TABLE 1-3 HISTORY OF US DA-ASAT TESTS.01-15TABLE 1-4 MAXMIMUM ALTITUDE REACHABLE BY SM-3 VARIANTS.01-17TABLE 2-1 IS TESTS CONDUCTED BY THE SOVIET UNION.02-03TABLE 2-2 SUSPECTED N

32、ARYAD FLIGHT TESTS.02-05TABLE 2-3 RECENT RUSSIAN RPOs.02-14TABLE 2-4 NUDOL FLIGHT TESTS TO DATE.02-19TABLE 3-1 RECENT CHINESE RPOs.03-09TABLE 3-2 HISTORY OF CHINESE DA-ASAT TESTS.03-15TABLE 4-1 INDIAN DA-ASAT TESTS IN SPACE.04-04TABLE 5-1 ORBITAL DEBRIS CREATED BY ASAT TESTS IN SPACE.05-01TABLE 15-1

33、 HISTORICAL US ASAT TESTS IN SPACE.15-02TABLE 15-2 HISTORICAL RUSSIAN ASAT TESTS IN SPACE.15-03TABLE 15-3 HISTORICAL CHINESE ASAT TESTS IN SPACE.15-04TABLE 15-4 HISTORICAL INDIAN ASAT TESTS IN SPACE.15-04xSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024L I S T O FA C R O N Y M SAADAdvanced Area DefenseABLAirborne La

34、serABMAnti-Ballistic MissileACCRESAdvisory Committeeon CommercialRemote SensingADFAustralian Defence ForceADRVAdvanced DebrisRemoval VehicleAEOSAdvanced Electro-Optical SystemAISAutomatedIdentification SystemAKMApogee Kick MotorALCORARPA Lincoln C-band Observables RadarAMSAcademy of Military Science

35、sANGELSAutomated Navigation and GuidanceExperiment forLocal SpaceAPOSOSAsia-Pacific Ground-Based Space Object Observation SystemAPSCOAsia-Pacific Space Co-operation OrganizationAPSSOAsia-Pacific SpaceScience ObservatoriesAPTAdvanced Persistent ThreatASATAntisatelliteASDFAerospace Self-Defence ForceA

36、SPOS OKPAutomated Warning System on Hazardous Situations in Outer SpaceATBMAnti-Tactical Ballistic MissileAWACSAirborne Early Warning and Control SystemsBMDBallistic MissileDefenseBMEWSBallistic Missile Early Warning SystemC2Command-and-ControlC4ISRCommand,Control,Communications,Computers,Intelligen

37、ce,Surveillance andReconnaissanceCASCChina AerospaceScience and TechnologyCorporationCASICChina AerospaceIndustrial CorporationCCAFSCape Canaveral Air Force StationCCDCharge-coupled DeviceCCSCounterCommunications SystemCDICenter for Defense InformationCFSCCCombined Force Space Component CommandCICCo

38、mmercialIntegration CellCMCCentral MilitaryCommissionCMOSComplementaryMetal-oxideSemiconductorxiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES CNEComputer Network ExploitationCNESCentre national dtudes spatialesCOILChemical Oxygen Iodine LaserCOMINTCommunicationsIntelligenceCOMSATCommunications SatelliteCSpOCComb

39、ined SpaceOperations CenterCSRSCounter Surveillance and Reconnaissance SystemDA-ASATDirect-Ascent ASATDARCDeep Space Advanced Radar CapabilityDARPADefense Advanced Research Projects AgencyDARTDemonstrationfor Autonomous Rendezvous TechnologyDAASData as a ServiceDDOSDistributed Denialof ServiceDEWDir

40、ected EnergyWeaponsDHSDepartment ofHomeland SecurityDIADefense Intelligence AgencyDNSDomain Name SystemDRDODefence Researchand Development OrganisationDSADefence Space AgencyDSCDefensive Space ControlDSSDefence Space StrategyEAGLEESPA AugmentedGeostationary Laboratory ExperimentECSEnvironmental Cont

41、rol SystemsEELVEvolved Expendable Launch VehicleEOEarth ObservationEOSATElectronic OceanSurveillance SatelliteEKVExoatmospheric Kill VehicleELINTElectronic IntelligenceEMPElectromagnetic PulseESPAEELV SecondaryPayload AdapterESPCEarth SystemPrediction CapabilityEWElectronic WarfareFBIFederal Bureau

42、of InvestigationFSBFederal SecurityServiceFYFiscal YearGBIGround-basedInterceptorGEOGeostationary Earth OrbitGEODSSGround-basedElectro-Optical Deep Space SurveillanceGLONASSGlobal NavigationSatellite SystemsxiiSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024GMDGround-based Missile DefenseGNSSGlobal NavigationSatelli

43、te SystemsGPSGlobal Positioning SystemGRAVESGrand Rseau Adapt la Veille SpatialeGSOGeosynchronous OrbitGSSAPGeosynchronous Space Situational Awareness ProgramGTOGeosynchronous Transfer OrbitHEOHighly Elliptical OrbitHIMARSHigh Mobility Artillery Rocket SystemHPMHigh-Power MicrowaveHTKHit-to-killIADC

44、Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination CommitteeICBMIntercontinentalBallistic MissileICSIndustrial Control SystemsILRSInternational Laser Ranging ServiceIMDOIsrael Missile Defense OrganizationIRBMIntermediate Range Ballistic MissileIRGCIslamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsISESInternational Space Environ

45、mental ServiceISONInternational Scientific Optical NetworkISRIntelligence,Surveillance,and ReconnaissanceISROIndian Space Research OrganisationITUInternationalTelecommunication UnionJASDFJapanese AirSelf-Defense ForceJAXAJapan AerospaceExploration AgencyJDAMJoint Direct Attack MunitionJFSCCJoint For

46、ce SpaceComponent CommandJICSpOCJoint InteragencyCombined Space Operations CenterJNWCJoint NavigationWarfare CenterJSpOCJoint SpaceOperations CenterJTF-SDJoint Task Force Space DefenseKARIKorea AerospaceResearch InstituteKCNAKorean Central News AgencyKIAMKeldysh Institute of Applied MathematicsKKVKi

47、netic Kill VehicleKRITKorea ResearchInstitute for Defense Technology Planning and AdvancementKWKilowattxiiiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES LACLine of Actual ControlLACELow-PowerAtmospheric CompensationExperimentLEOLow-Earth OrbitLPARLarge Phased-Array RadarMDAMissile Defense AgencyMDOMultidomainOpe

48、rationsMEOMedium Earth OrbitMIRACLMid-Infrared Advanced Chemical LaserMi-TExMicro-satelliteTechnology ExperimentMITMMan-in-the-middleMMWMillimeter WaveMOSSAICMaintenance of space situational awareness integrated capabilitiesMOTIFMaui Optical Tracking and Identification FacilityMUBLCOMMultiple PathBe

49、yond Line of Site CommunicationNASANational Aeronautics and SpaceAdministrationNASICNational Air and Space Intelligence CenterNavICNavigation with Indian ConstellationNAVWARNavigation WarfareNESDISNational Environmental Satellite,Data,and Information ServiceNETRANetwork for Space Object Tracking and

50、 AnalysisNOAANational Oceanicand AtmosphericAdministrationNOTAMNotice to Air MissionsNPTNuclearNon-Proliferation TreatyNRLNaval ResearchLaboratoryNSANational Security AgencyNSDCNational SpaceDefense CenterNSSNational SpaceStrategyOCSOffensiveCounterspaceOKNIntegrated ObservationComplexOSCOffensive S

51、paceControlOTVOrbital Test VehiclePADPrithvi Air DefencePARCSPerimeter Acquisition Radar Attack SystemPAVE PAWSPrecision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning SystemPDVPrithvi Defence VehiclePGMPrecision-GuidedMunitionsPLAPeoples Liberation ArmyPMOPurple MountainObservatoryxivSECURE WORLD F

52、OUNDATION 04/2024PNTPositioning,Navigation,and TimingPRAMPhotovoltaicRadio-frequency Antenna ModuleQZSSQuasi Zenith Satellite SystemRAFRoyal Air ForceRATRemote Access ToolRDT&EResearch,Development,Testing,and EvaluationRFRadiofrequencyRKARelativistic Klystron AmplifierRORSATRadar OceanReconnaissance

53、SatelliteRPORendezvous andProximity OperationsSAASMSelective Availability Anti-Spoofing ModuleSAMSurface-to-air MissileSARSynthetic Aperture RadarSASTShanghai Academy of Spaceflight TechnologySATCOMSatelliteCommunicationsSBSSSpace-BasedSurveillance SystemSCADASupervisory Control and Data Acquisition

54、SDFSelf-Defense ForcesSDIStrategic Defense InitiativeSDIOStrategic Defense Initiative OfficeSDMUSpace DomainMission UnitSDOACSpace DebrisObservation and Data Application CenterSFIASpace ForceIntelligence ActivitySHFSuper-High FrequencySIGINTSignals IntelligenceSIPSatellite Interceptor ProgramSKKP ,t

55、r.Tsentr kontrolyakosmicheskogoprostranstva(“Space Surveillance System”)SLBMSubmarine-launched Ballistic MissileSLRSatellite Laser RangingSLVSpace Launch VehicleSPRSpace StrategicPortfolio ReviewSSASpace Situational AwarenessSSCSpace SystemsCommandSSNSpace Surveillance NetworkSSSSpace Surveillance S

56、ystemSSTSpace Surveillance TelescopeSWACSpace Warfighting Analysis CenterSWFSecure WorldFoundationxvGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES TELTransporter-erector-launcherTHAADTerminal High Altitude Area DefenseTRADEXTarget Resolutionand DiscriminationExperimentTsNIIKhMCentral ScientificResearch Institutef

57、or Chemistry andMechanicsTT&CTracking,Telemetry,and ControlTT&MTargeting,Tracking,and MeasurementUASUnmanned Aerial SystemsUAVUnmanned Aerial VehicleUHFUltra-High Frequency UKSAUnited KingdomSpace AgencyUKSpOCUK Space Operations CentreUSAFUnited States Air ForceUSSFUnited States Space ForceUSINDOPAC

58、OMUnited StatesIndo-PacificCommandUSSPACECOMUnited States SpaceCommandUSSRUnion of SovietSocialist Republics VSATVery Small ApertureTerminalXGEOBeyond Geostationary Earth OrbitYODAYeux en Orbite pour un Dmonstrateur AgilexviSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024The space domain is undergoing a significant

59、set of changes.A growing number of countries and commercial actors are getting involved in space,resulting in more innovation and benefits on Earth,but also more congestion and competition in space.From a security perspective,an increasing number of countries are looking to use space to enhance thei

60、r military capabilities and national security.The growing use of,and reliance on,space for national security has also led more countries to look at developing their own counterspace capabilities that can be used to deceive,disrupt,deny,degrade,or destroy space systems.The existence of counterspace c

61、apabilities is not new,but the circumstances surrounding them are.Today there are increased incentives for development,and potential use,of offensive counterspace capabilities.There are also greater potential consequences from their widespread use that could have global repercussions well beyond the

62、 military,as huge parts of the global economy and society are increasingly reliant on space applications.This report compiles and assesses publicly available information on thecounterspace capabilities being developed by multiple countries across fivecategories:direct-ascent,co-orbital,electronic wa

63、rfare,directed energy,and cyber.It assesses the current and near-term future capabilities for each country,along with their potential military utility.The evidence shows significant research and development of a broad range of destructive and non-destructive counterspace capabilities in multiple cou

64、ntries.However,only non-destructive capabilities are actively being used against satellites in current military operations.The following provides a more detailed summary of each countrys capabilities.E X E C U T I V ES U M M A RYUSRUSSIACHINAINDIAAUS.FRANCEIRANISRAELJAPANN.KOREAS.KOREAUKLEO Direct A

65、scentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessNONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA LEGEND:xviiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co

66、-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessNONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA 1 THE UNITED STATESThe United States has conducted multiple tests of technologies for closeapproach and rendezvous in both LEO and GEO,along with tracking,targeting,and hit-to-kill(HTK)interce

67、pt technologies that could lead to a co-orbitalantisatellite(ASAT)capability.These tests and demonstrations were conducted for other non-offensive missions,such as missile defense,on-orbit inspections,and satellite servicing,and the United States does not have an acknowledged program to develop co-o

68、rbital capabilities.However,the United Statespossesses the technological capability to develop a co-orbital capability ina short period of time if it chooses to.While the United States does not have an operational,acknowledged direct ascent antisatellite(DA-ASAT)program,it does have operational midc

69、ourse missile defense interceptors that have been demonstrated in an ASAT role against a low LEO satellite.The United States has developed dedicatedDA-ASATs in the past,both conventional and nuclear-tipped,and likelypossesses the ability to do so in the near future should it choose so.The United Sta

70、tes has an operational electronic warfare(EW)offensive counterspace system,the Counter Communications System(CCS),which is deployed globally to provide uplink jamming capability against geostationary communications satellites.The United States has also initiated a program called Meadowlands to upgra

71、de the CCS capabilities.Through its Navigation Warfare program,the United States has the capability to jam and interfere with the civil signals of global navigation satellite services(GNSS)within a local area of operation to prevent their effective use by adversaries and has demonstrated doing so in

72、 several military exercises.The United States likely could jam military GNSS signals as well,although the effectiveness is difficult to assess based on publicly available information.The effectiveness of US measures to counter adversarial jamming and spoofing operations against military GPS signals

73、is not known.Over the past several decades,the United States has conducted significant research and development on the use of ground-based high-energy lasersfor counterspace and other purposes.We assess that there are no technologicalroadblocks to the United States operationalizing them for counters

74、pace applications.With its Satellite Laser Ranging(SLR)sites and defense research facilities,the United States possesses low-power laser systems with the capability to dazzle,and possibly blind,Earth observation(EO)imaging satellites.However,there is no indication that these potential high or low po

75、wer capabilities have been operationalized.LEGEND:xviiiSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024There is no public evidence that the United States has a space-based directedenergy weapons(DEW)capability.The Missile Defense Agency(MDA)is planning to conduct research into the feasibility of DEW for defending ag

76、ainst ballistic missiles and the Space Force has expressed an interest in a directed energy architecture in general(not necessarily space-based).If developed,these systems may have a capability against other orbiting satellites and,depending on their target acquisition and tracking capabilities may

77、be considered de facto anti-satellite systems.The United States currently possesses the most advanced SSA capabilities in the world,particularly for military applications.US SSA capabilities date to the beginning of the Cold War and leverage significant infrastructure developedfor missile warning an

78、d missile defense.The core of its SSA capabilities isa robust,geographically dispersed network of ground-based radars and telescopes and space-based telescopes.The United States is investing heavily in upgrading its SSA capabilities by deploying new radars and telescopes in the Southern Hemisphere,u

79、pgrading existing sensors,and signing SSA data sharing agreements with other countries and satellite operators.The United States still faces challenges in modernizing the software and computer systems used to conduct SSA analysis and is increasingly looking to leverage commercial capabilities.The Un

80、ited States has had established doctrine and policy on counterspace capabilities for several decades,although not always publicly expressed.Most US presidential administrations since the 1960s have directed or authorized research and development of counterspace capabilities,and in some cases greenli

81、t testing or operational deployment of counterspace systems.These capabilities have typically been limited in scope and designed to counter a specific military threat,rather than be used as a broad coercive or deterrent threat.The current US military doctrine includes offensive and defensive militar

82、y force and is focused on suppressing adversary uses of space in an armed conflict while protecting the United States ability to use space.The United States recently underwent a major reorganization of its military space activities as part of a renewed focus on space as a warfighting domain.Since 20

83、14,US policymakers have placed increased focus on space security,and have increasingly talked publicly about preparing for a potential“war in space.”This rhetoric has been accompanied by a renewed focus on reorganizingnational security space structures and increasing the resilience of space systems.

84、This has culminated in the reestablishment of US Space Command(USSPACECOM)and the creation of the US Space Force(USSF),which assumed the responsibilities of US Strategic Command for space warfighting and Air Force Space Command(AFSPC)for operating,training,and equipping of space forces,respectively.

85、To date,the missions of these new organizations are largely a continuation of previous military space missions,although some have advocated for expanding their focus to include cislunar activities and more offensive weapons.It is possible that the United States has also begun developing new offensiv

86、e counterspace capabilities,although the United States has publicly stated it will not test destructive DA-ASAT weapons.The United States also continues to hold annual space wargames and exercises that increasingly involve close allies and commercial partners.xixGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES NONE

87、 SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA 2 RUSSIAThere is strong evidence that Russia has embarked on a set of programs since 2010 to regain offensive counterspace capabilities.Since 2010,Russia has been testing technologies for RPO in both LEO and GEO that could lead to or support a co-orbital ASAT capa

88、bility,and some of those efforts have links to a Cold War-era LEO co-orbital ASAT program.Additional evidence suggests Russia may have started a new co-orbital ASAT program called Burevestnik,potentially supported by a surveillance and tracking program called Nivelir.The technologies developed by th

89、ese programs could also be used for non-aggressive applications,including surveilling and inspecting foreign satellites,and most of the on-orbit RPO activities done to date match these missions.However,Russia has deployed two“sub-satellites”at high velocity,which suggests at least some of their LEO

90、RPO activities are of a weapons nature.Russia has long had the potential for a DA-ASAT capability through its historical ballistic missile defense capabilities and had DA-ASAT development programs in the past that never fully became operational.In November 2021,after more than a decade of developmen

91、t and testing,Russia successfully demonstrated a DA-ASAT capability against a LEO satellite.It is unclear whether this system,the Nudol,will become operational soon,and it does not appear to have the capability to threaten targets beyond LEO.Russia places a high priority on integrating electronic wa

92、rfare(EW)into military operations and has been investing heavily in modernizing this capability.Most of the upgrades have focused on multifunction tactical systems whose counterspace capability is limited to jamming of user terminals within tactical ranges.Russia has a multitude of systems that can

93、jam GPS receivers withina local area,potentially interfering with the guidance systems of unmannedaerial vehicles(UAVs),guided missiles,and precision-guided munitions(PGMs),but has no publicly known capability to interfere with the GPS satellitesthemselves using radio frequency interference.The Russ

94、ian Army fields several types of mobile EW systems,some of which can jam specific satellite communications user terminals within tactical ranges.Russia can likely jam communications satellites uplinks over a wide area from fixed ground stations facilities.Russia has operational experience in the use

95、 of counterspace EW capabilities from current military campaigns,as well as using it within Russia for protecting strategic locations and VIPs.New evidence suggests Russia R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectro

96、nic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessLEGEND:xxSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024may be developing high-powered space-based EW platforms to augment its existing ground-based platforms.Russia has a strong technological knowledge base in directed energy physics and is developing a number of military appl

97、ications for laser systems in avariety of environments.Russia has a mobile ground-based laser dazzler system,Peresvet,that is linked to protection of their road mobile intercontinental ballistic missile force.Russia may have revived a legacy program whose goal is to develop an aircraft-borne laser s

98、ystem for targeting the optical sensors of imagery reconnaissance satellites,although there is no indication that an operational capability has been achieved.Although not their intended purpose,Russian ground-based satellite laser ranging(SLR)facilities could be used to dazzle the sensors of optical

99、 imagery satellites.There is no indication that Russia is developing,or intending to develop,high-power space-based laser weapons.Russia has sophisticated SSA capabilities that are likely second only to the United States.Russian SSA capabilities date to the Cold War and leverage significant infrastr

100、ucture originally developed for missile warning and missile defense.Although some of these capabilities atrophied after the fall of the Soviet Union,Russia has engaged in several modernization efforts since the early 2000s to reinvigorate them.While the government owned and operated SSA capabilities

101、 are limited to the geographic boundaries of the former Soviet Union,Russia is engaging in international civil and scientific cooperative efforts that likely give it access to data from SSA sensors around the globe.Today,Russia maintains a catalog of Earth-orbiting space objects in LEO that is somew

102、hat smaller than that of the United States but a slightly more robust catalog of HEO and GEO objects.Russian military thinkers see modern warfare as a struggle over information dominance and net-centric operations that can often take place in domains without clear boundaries and contiguous operating

103、 areas.To meet the challenge posed by the space aspect of modern warfare,Russia is pursuing lofty goals of incorporating EW capabilities throughout its military to both protect its own space-enabled capabilities and degrade or deny those capabilities to its adversary.In space,Russia is seeking to mi

104、tigate the superiority of US space assets by fielding a number of ground-,air-,and space-based offensivecapabilities.Russia has recently reorganized its military space forces into a neworganization that combines space,air defense,and missile defense capabilities.Although technical challenges remain,

105、the Russian leadership has indicated that Russia will continue to seek parity with the United States in space.xxiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA 3 CHINAChina has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and rendezvous in both low-earth orbi

106、t(LEO)and geostationary earth orbit(GEO)that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability.However,the public evidence indicates they have not conducted an actual destructive intercept of a target,and there is no proof that these technologies are definitively being developed for counterspace use as opp

107、osed to intelligence gathering or other purposes.China has at least one,and possibly as many as three,programs underwayto develop DA-ASAT capabilities,either as dedicated counterspace systemsor as midcourse missile defense systems that could provide counterspace capabilities.China has engaged in mul

108、tiple,progressive tests of these capabilitiessince 2005,indicating a serious and sustained organizational effort.Chinese DA-ASAT capability against LEO targets is likely mature and may be operationally fielded on mobile launchers.Chinese DA-ASAT capability against deep space targets(medium Earth orb

109、it,or MEO,and GEO)is likely still in the experimentalor development phase,and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude whether it will become an operational capability in the near future.China is likely to have significant EW counterspace capabilities against GNSS and satellite communications,al

110、though the exact nature is difficult to determine through open sources.Chinese military doctrine places a heavy emphasis on electronic warfare as part of the broader information warfare,and in recent years,China has taken steps to integrate space,cyber,and electronic warfarecapabilities under a sing

111、le military command.While there is significant evidence of Chinese scientific research and development of EW capabilities for counterspace applications and some open-source evidence of Chinese EW counterspace capabilities being deployed,there is no public evidence of their active use in military ope

112、rations.China is likely to be developing directed energy weapons(DEW)for counterspace use,although public details are scarce.There is strong evidence of dedicated research and development and reports of testing at five different locations,but limited details on the operational status and maturity of

113、 any fielded capabilities.China is developing a sophisticated network of ground-based optical telescopes and radars for detecting,tracking,and characterizing space objects.Like the United States and Russia,several of the Chinese SSA radars also serve missile warning functions.While China lacks an ex

114、tensive network of SSA trackingassets outside its borders,it does have a fleet of tracking ships and is developing relationships with countries that may host future sensors.Since 2010,China has deployed several satellites capable of conducting RPO on orbit,which likely aids in its ability to charact

115、erize and collect intelligence on foreign satellites.R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessLEGEND:xxiiSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

116、 Although official Chinese statements on space warfare and weapons have remained consistently aligned to the peaceful purposes of outer space,unofficially they have become more nuanced.China has recently designated space as a military domain,and military writings state that the goal of space warfare

117、 and operations is to achieve space superiority using offensive and defensive means in connection with their broader strategic focus on asymmetric cost imposition,access denial,and information dominance.In 2016,China reorganized its space and counterspace forces,as part of a larger military reorgani

118、zation,and placed them in a new major force structure that also has control over electronic warfare and cyber.Chinas considerable investment in developing and testing counterspace capabilities,as detailed in this chapter,suggest they see space as a domain for future conflicts,whether or not that is

119、officially stated.That said,it is uncertain whether China would fully utilize its offensive counterspace capabilities in a future conflict or whether the goal is to use them as a deterrent against US aggression.There is no public evidence of China actively using destructive counterspace capabilities

120、 in current military operations,although it is likely they are using SSA and electronic warfare in at least some support roles.4 INDIAIndia has over five decades of experience with space capabilities,but most of that has been civil in focus.It is only relatively recently that India has started organ

121、izationally making way for its military to become active users of space and creating explicit military space capabilities.Indias military has developed indigenous missile defense and long-range ballistic missile programs that could lead to DA-ASAT capabilities,should the need arise.India demonstrate

122、d its ASAT capability in March 2019 when it destroyed one of its satellites.While India continues to insist that it is against the weaponization of space,India may be moving toward an offensive counterspace posture.India is reportedly in the early stages of working on directed energy weapons.R&DTEST

123、INGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessLEGEND:xxiiiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA 6 AUSTRALIAAustr

124、alia is a relative newcomer in space,although it has long played a support role by hosting ground infrastructure for satellite communications and command and control.Recently,however,Australia has been laying the groundwork for more indigenous space capabilities,including military.It has recently st

125、arted a military space organization,is building out a policy framework for its military space priorities,is putting concerted efforts and resources into building its own SSA capabilities,is examining an EW capability for its Department of Defence,and is looking into non-destructive ways in which to

126、interfere with enemy satellites.7 FRANCEWhile France has long had a space program,as well as military satellites,it was not until recently that France had an explicit focus on offensive and defensivecounterspace activities.The major change occurred in July 2019 with therelease of the first French Sp

127、ace Defense Strategy,which elevated Frenchmilitary space efforts and control of French military satellites.The French Space Defense Strategy focuses on two main areas:to improve space situational awareness around French space assets and provide them with some form of active defense against threats.W

128、hile some French officials suggested machine guns on satellites,the actual plan calls for ground-based lasers for dazzling and satellites equipped for on-orbit inspections and also with offensive lasers.In 2021 and 2022,France carried out military exercises,codenamed“ASTERX,”in outer space,testing t

129、he capabilities of its Space Command,as part of Frances evolving goal to be the worlds third-largest spatial power.R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessR&DTESTINGOPERATION

130、ALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessLEGEND:LEGEND:xxivSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA 8 IRANIran has a nascent

131、 space program,building and launching small satellites that have limited capability.Technologically,it is unlikely Iran has the capacity to build on-orbit or direct-ascent anti-satellite capabilities,and little military motivation for doing so at this point.Irans military appears to have an independ

132、ent ability to launch satellites,separate from Irans civil space program.Iran has not demonstrated any ability to build homing kinetic kill vehicles,and its ability tobuild nuclear devices is still constrained.Iran has demonstrated an EW capability to persistently interfere with the broadcast of com

133、mercial satellite signals,although its capacity to interfere with military signals is difficult to ascertain.9 ISRAELIn 1988,Israel became the eighth country to be able to launch its own satellite into orbit.It has maintained a space program that has largely been civil innature and co-developed a mi

134、ssile defense system that has been until recently strictly for endoatmospheric interception of rockets.However,in recent years Israel has moved to expand its military space program and there is evidenceit has developed counterspace capabilities.These include the recentdemonstration of an exoatmosphe

135、ric missile defense intercept capabilityand use of EW in active military conflicts.It is possible Israel has additional counterspace capabilities that are not publicly visible or documented.R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDire

136、cted EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessR&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessLEGEND:LEGEND:xxvGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERT

137、AIN NO DATA NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational Awareness10 JAPANJapan has long been a well-established space actor and its space activitie

138、s have historically been non-military in nature.In 2008,Japan released a Basic Space Law that allowed for national security-related activities in space and since then,government officials have begun to publicly speak about developing various counterspace capabilities or developing military SSA capac

139、ity.Japanis currently undergoing a major reorganization of its military space activities and the development of enhanced SSA capabilities to support military and civil applications.While Japan does not have any acknowledged offensive counterspace capabilities,it is exploring whether to develop them.

140、Japan does have a latent ASAT capability via its missile defense system but has never tested it in that capacity.11 NORTH KOREANorth Korea has no demonstrated capability to mount kinetic attacks on space assets:neither a DA-ASAT nor a co-orbital system.In its official statements,North Korea has not

141、mentioned ASAT operations or intent,suggesting that there is no clear doctrine in Pyongyangs thinking at this point.North Korea does not appear highly motivated to develop dedicated counterspace assets,though certain capabilities in its ballistic missile program might be eventually evolved for such

142、a purpose.North Korea has exhibited the capability to jam civilian GPS signals within a limited geographical area.Their capability against US military GPS signals is not known.There has been no demonstrated ability of North Korea to interfere with satellite communications,although their technical ca

143、pability remains unknown.R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessLEGEND:LEGEND:xxviSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/202412 SOUTH KOREAOver the last several years,South Korea has ha

144、d a growing focus on military space capabilities.It is working to enhance the space capabilities of its Air Force through the establishment of a Space Operations Center,cooperating with the United States on sharing SSA capabilities,and developing its own longer-range ballistic missiles and space lau

145、nch vehicles;it also has expressed interest in developing its own reversible counterspace capabilities.13 THE UNITED KINGDOMThe United Kingdom has long played a supporting role in military space activities through its participation in NATO and its bilateral relationship with the United States.Over t

146、he past few years,the United Kingdom has begun to add additional elements to increase its indigenous military space capabilities,primarily in SSA and policy,organization,and doctrine.To date,the United Kingdom has not publicly announced any specific plans to develop offensive counterspace capabiliti

147、es.NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Direct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-OrbitalDirected EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessLEGEND:NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA R&DTESTINGOPERATIONALUSE IN CONFLICTLEO Dire

148、ct AscentMEO/GEO Direct AscentLEO Co-OrbitalMEO/GEO Co-Orbital Directed EnergyElectronic WarfareSpace Situational AwarenessLEGEND:xxviiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 14 CYBER CAPABILITIESMultiple countries possess cyber capabilities that could be used against space systems;however,actual evidence

149、of cyber attacks in the public domain is limited.The United States,Russia,China,North Korea,Israel and Iran have all demonstrated the ability and willingness to engage in offensive cyber attacks against non-space targets.Additionally,a growing number of non-state actors are actively probing commerci

150、al satellite systems and discovering cybervulnerabilities that are similar to those found in non-space systems.This indicatesthat manufacturers and developers of space systems may not yet have reached the same level of cyber hardness as other sectors.But to date,there have only been a few publicly-d

151、isclosed cyber attacks directly targeting space systems and nearly all have gone after the end user segment and not satellites themselves.The largest was a cyber attack by Russia against the user segment of Viasats commercial satellite broadband service in Europe,which coincided with the first day R

152、ussian forces entered Ukraine in February 2022.There is a clear trend toward lower barriers to access,and widespreadvulnerabilities,coupled with reliance on relatively unsecured commercial space systems,create the potential for non-state actors to carry out some counterspace cyber operations without

153、 state assistance.However,whilethis threat deserves attention and will likely grow in severity over the next decade,there remains a stark difference at present between the cyber attack capabilities of leading nation-states and other actors.xxviiiSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024The following are brief

154、 summaries of the major additions for the 2024 edition of this report,broken down by country,along with a page reference to their location in the text.Individual minor changes or the impact of changes on summaries and assessments have been integrated into the text.Revised assessment of US efforts to

155、 develop new offensive counterspace capabilities(1-01)Added history of the X-37B program and details about the end of OTV-6 and the current OTV-7 missions(1-04)Added retirement of two original GSSAP satellites,launch of two new GSSAP satellites to the GEO region,and information on non-US satellites

156、visited by GSSAP(1-09)Added launch of Tetra-1 payload to the GEO region,which has been used in training maneuvers as part of Scarlet Star(1-11)Added new progress on the Aegis Ashore site in Poland(1-17)Added CCS operations by the Air National Guard and revised the number of operational CCS systems(1

157、-21)Revised expected completion date and budget forecast for the Meadow lands upgrade to CCS(1-21)Added the second and third iteration of the USSF Black Skies live fire space jamming exercises and the Red Skies orbital warfare training scenario exercise(1-22)Added further delays to the OCX ground sy

158、stem for GPS-III(1-23)Added additional GPS jamming exercises conducted by the US military in several US states(1-23)Added details about the MOSSAIC program to upgrade and expand US ground-based optical telescopes for SSA(1-31)Added announcement of US,UK,and Australian partnership in the DARC program

159、 to develop new deep space tracking radars(1-31)01 The United States/2 0 2 4A D DI T IO N SxxixGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES Added mention of Space System Commands Project Apollo to tackle critical SSA challenges(1-32)Added launch of the first SILENT BARKER payload in the GEO region and clarifica

160、tion of the differences between SILENT BARKER and GSSAP(1-32)Added launch of three SpRCO payloads to the GEO region to assist with threat assessment collection(1-32)Added details on the US capabilities for space weather prediction and warning(1-34)Revised US national space policy and doctrine on cou

161、nterspace to incorporate the new changes made in Joint Publication 3-14 and Space Doctrine Publication 3-0(1-36)Added changes to the relationship between USSPACECOM,USSTRATCOM,and USNORTHCOM as dictated by the 2023 revision to the Unified Combatant Plan(1-37)Added the DA-ASAT missile testing morator

162、ium initiative(1-38)Added CSO Saltzmans new Competitive Endurance theory of success for the Space Force(1-38)Added the DoDs Space Policy Review(1-39)Added Italy,Japan,and Norway joining the CSpO initiative(1-39)Added reorganization of USSPACECOM by merging JTF-SD and JTF-CFSCC into US Space Forces-S

163、pace Command(1-40)Added activation of the 75th Intelligence,Surveillance,and Reconnaissance Squadron as the first targeting unit supporting the USSF(1-41)Added ongoing debate over creating a Space National Guard(1-42)Added US Armys new Multidomain Operations memo on how it plans to leverage space(1-

164、42)Added details on the 2023 Schriever Wargame participants(1-43)Added USSOUTHCOM holding its first defensive space control operation as part of the Resolute Sentinel 23 exercise(1-43)Clarified that only the first two Almaz space stations carried cannons(2-04)Added launch of Cosmos 2565 and subseque

165、nt deployments of Cosmos2566 and Object D(2-11)Updated orbital history of Luch(Olymp-K)and further details on its likelysignals intelligence collection mission(2-13)Added launch of Luch Olymp 2 satellite and its subsequent RPO with severalUS and European communications satellites in GEO(2-13)Added R

166、PO between Cosmos 2562 and Resurs-P in LEO(2-15)Added reports of Russia developing a new co-orbital weapon based on anuclear bomb(2-15)Correct Burevestnik as being linked to a co-orbital ASAT program and not aDA-ASAT(2-17)Removed two presumed Nudol flight tests(April and June 2021)that did notactual

167、ly take place(2-19)02 Russia/xxxSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024 Added reports of GPS jamming in Eastern Ukraine impacting militarysystems(2-25)Added increased jamming and spoofing of GNSS in the Baltic Sea affectingcivil aviation(2-26)Added report of Russian use of Tobol EW system against Starlink(2

168、-26)Added Russian jamming of commercial communications satellites overEastern Ukraine(2-27)Added new Razvyazka phased array radar near Chekhov reachingoperational status(2-34)Added information on the completion of the Milky Way upgrades at the OKNcomplex in the Russian Far East(2-36)Added NEO-01 sat

169、ellite that is reported to have conducted an experimental capture of a tethered object using a deployed net(3-04)Added details about the end of the second flight of Chinas Shenlong space-plane and the launch of the third flight(3-05)Updated RPO activities of the SJ-17 and TJS-3 satellites in GEO(3-0

170、6)Added launch of the SJ-23 satellite to GEO and its release and RPO of another space object(3-09)Added potential new test of the DN-3 DA-ASAT system in April 2023(3-15)Added discussion of potential space-based jamming of satellite capabilities(3-18)Added reports of the laser facility at Bofu having

171、 its roof opened during overflights of US commercial remote sensing satellites(3-19)Added reports of advances in power systems to support high power micro-wave beam weapons(3-20)Clarified the locations of Chinas six known phased array missile warning radars(3-21)Added Chinese-Egyptian agreement to h

172、ost a new satellite tracking station in Egypt(3-22)Clarified distinction between Chinas official views on space warfighting and our assessment based on their observed programs and activities(3-23)Added new information on the organization of the SSF for counterspace command and control(3-25)Reorganiz

173、ed chapter to lead with co-orbital ASAT technologies(4-01)Added second flight of the Indian spaceplane(4-01)Added reports of new investments by the Indian military into ground-basedoffensive EW capabilities(4-05)Added new investments by the Indian military and DRDO on directedenergy weapons(4-05)Upd

174、ated the timeline for the Project NETRA SSA program(4-05)04 India/03 China/xxxiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES Added publication of the first ever Indian National Space Policy(4-05)Added comments by senior military leadership on the value of future space-based offensive platforms(4-07)Added Austral

175、ian purchase of a CCS offensive counterspace EW systemfrom the US(6-01)Added announcement of Australia hosting the first DARC deep space trackingsite(6-01)Added Australia pledge not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT missile tests(6-02)Added release of the Australian Strategic Defense Review(6-03)Reorga

176、nized chapter to lead with co-orbital ASAT technologies(7-01)Added report of Frances willingness to share technology on counterspaceEW capabilities with Saudi Arabia(7-01)Added reports of French authorities discovered multiple GNSS jammersnear the Merville airport(7-01)Added details on the FLAMHE pr

177、ogram to place laser-armed satellites in GEOand the BLOOMLASE program to develop ground-based laser dazzlers(7-02)Added telescope at Les Makes Observatory(7-03)Added CNES contract with ArianeGroup to develop a network of ground andspace-based SSA sensors(7-03)Added French pledge not to conduct destr

178、uctive DA-ASAT missile tests(7-04)Reorganized chapter to lead with co-orbital ASAT technologies(8-01)Updated details on the satellites Iran has been able to place in space(8-01)Added first successful launch of the Simorgh SLV by the Iranian Space Agencyto place the Kayhan-2,Hatef-1,and Mehda satelli

179、tes in LEO(8-02)Added third successful launch of the Qassed SLV by the IRGC to place theNoor-3 satellite in LEO(8-03)Added second successful launch of the Qaem-100 SLV by the IRGC to placethe Sorayya satellite in LEO and announcements on the development of theupgraded Qaem-105 and Qaem-120 version(8

180、-03)Added reports of GPS interference affecting commercial aircraft,which wastraced to outside of Tehran (8-04)Added announcement of the Aerospace Forces Space Command within theIRGC(8-05)06 Australia/07 France/08 Iran/xxxiiSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024 Added country for the first time Reorganized

181、 chapter to lead with co-orbital ASAT technologies(10-01)Added new partnership between Northrop Grumman and IHI to developsmall,highly maneuverable satellites for SSA and to protect satellites inGEO(10-02)Added Japans pledge not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT missile tests(10-03)Added new Space Secu

182、rity Initiative that outlines Japans strategy forresponding to space threats(10-04)Re-organized chapter to lead with co-orbital ASAT technologies(11-01)Added details on the assessed capabilities of the Malligyong-1 remotesensing satellite(11-01)Added three successful flight tests of the Hwasong-17 m

183、obile ICBM(11-02)Added the first unsuccessful and first successful launch of the Chollima-1 SLVthat placed the Malligyong-1 satellite in LEO(11-03)Added the first successful flight of the Nuri SLV that placed eight satellites inLEO(12-01)Added South Koreas pledge not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT m

184、issiletests(12-02)Added increase budget for space systems,including a new SLV and spacedefense programs(12-03)Added table-top exercise on how to respond to dangers from space andinteragency coordination(12-03)Added request to industry for bids on developing a new ground-basedtracking telescope in Cy

185、prus(1301)Added UK creating the Joint Task Force Space-Defense Commercial Operations Cell(13-01)Added announcement of the UK joining the US and Australia in the DARCdeep space tracking radar program(13-01)Added the UKs pledge not to conduct destructive DA-ASAT missile tests(13-03)11 North Korea/12 S

186、outh Korea/09 Israel/13 The United Kingdom/10 Japan/xxxiiiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 16 Appendix II /14 Cyber/Added Killnet hacktivist denial of service attack on Starlink(14-06)Added cyber attack on Russian satellite communications providerDozor-Teleport(14-06)Added fifth category of cyber at

187、tacks against satellites themselves and“hack-a-thon”contests by the USAF and ESA to attack simulated or realsatellites(14-08)Added new research from Blackhat 2023 on cyber security weaknesses ofacademic and scientific cubesats(14-08)Added reports of classified US assessment that China is developing

188、sophisticated cyber weapons to seize control of satellites during wartime(14-09)Fixed coordinates of Plesetsk Space Launch Center Site 133(16-6)Added imagery of the Wenchang Space Launch Center on Hainan Island(16-15)Added imagery of the Razvyazka radar at Chekhov(16-47)xxxivSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

189、04/2024A C K N O W L E D G E-M E N T SThis publication would not have been possible without the contributions from the following individuals who contributed their time and expertise in a personal capacity in developing the original and subsequent editions.We are deeply grateful for their expertise a

190、nd commitment.This work is a synthesis of all these individual contributions with those from SWF staff,and as such,Secure World Foundation bears all responsibility for any errors or omissions.We also would like to thank the COMSPOC Corporation for assisting with some of the imagery and graphics.Cath

191、erine DillGilles DoucetKylee DickinsonJeffrey EdmondsLaura GregoMarissa MartinLouison MazeaudBrandon KelleyJonathan McDowellSean OConnorPavel PodvigKevin PollpeterRobert RonciTamara TansoSeth WaltonJosh WolnyxxxvGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES F O R E W O R DSpace security has become an increasingl

192、y salient policy issue.Over the last decade,there has been growing concern from multiple governments about the reliance on vulnerable space capabilities for national security and the corresponding proliferation of offensive counterspace capabilities that could be used to disrupt,deny,degrade,or dest

193、roy space systems.This in turn has led to increased rhetoric from some countries about the need to prepare for future conflicts on Earth to extend into space and calls from some corners to increase the development of offensive counterspace capabilities and put in place more aggressive policies and p

194、ostures.Unfortunately,much of this debate has taken place out of sight of the public,largely due to the reluctance of most countries to talk openly about the subject.Part of this can be traced to the classified nature of the intelligence on offensive counterspace capabilities and to the unwillingnes

195、s to reveal details that could compromise sources and methods.But part of it is also the political sensitivity of the topic and the discrepancies between what countries say in public and what they may be doing behind the scenes.At the same time,some media outlets and pundits have used what little in

196、formation is known to make hyperbolic claims that do not add constructively to the debate.We feel strongly that a more open and public debate on these issues is urgently needed.Space is not the sole domain of militaries and intelligence services,nor is space security and stability something that onl

197、y matters to geopolitical rivals.Our global society and economy are increasingly dependent on space capabilities,and a future conflict in space could have massive,long-term negative repercussions that are felt here on Earth,as everyone on this planet is a user of space data in some form.The public s

198、hould be as aware of the developing threats and risks of different policy options as would be the case for other national security issues in the air,land,and sea domains.The purpose of the project is to provide a public assessment of counterspace capabilities being developed by countries based on un

199、classified information.We hope doing so will increase public knowledge of these issues,the willingness of policymakers to discuss these issues openly,and the involvement of other stakeholders in the debate.xxxviSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024Finally,we must note that this publication is not meant to

200、 be the conclusive answer on these issues.We have done our best to base our findings and assessments on publicly available data,and we would like to thank our expert contributors for their hard work on this issue.However,some of the topics discussed here are difficult to assess using open sources,an

201、d we acknowledge that significant gaps are likely to remain.Our limited resources also prevented us from covering all the topics we hoped to.We intend to continue to publish updated editions of this publication that address these shortcomings,and work with the broader space community to improve this

202、 assessment.Brian Weeden and Victoria SamsonxxxviiGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES The space domain is undergoing a significant set of changes.A growing number of countries and commercial actors are getting involved in space,resulting in more innovation and benefits on Earth but also more congestion

203、 and competition in space.From a security perspective,an increasing number of countries are looking to use space to enhance their military capabilitiesand national security.Most of the space applications being worked on are not new and have been developed by the United States or the Soviet Union sin

204、ce the beginning of the Space Age.Space-based,intelligence,surveillance,reconnaissance(ISR),positioning navigation and timing(PNT),and satellite communications(SATCOM)are staples of military space applications.What has changed is the proliferation of these capabilities beyond just superpowers.The gr

205、owing use of,and reliance on,space for national security has alsoled more countries to look at developing their counterspace capabilities.Counterspace,also known as space control,is the set of capabilities ortechniques that are used to gain space superiority.Space superiority is the ability to use s

206、pace for ones own purposes while denying it to an adversary for a limited time and location.Accordingly,counterspace capabilities have both offensive and defensive elements,which are both supported by space situational awareness(information about the space environment).Defensivecounterspace helps pr

207、otect ones own space assets from attack,while offensive counterspace tries to prevent the adversary from using their space assets.Anti-satellite(ASAT)weapons are a subset of offensive counterspace capabilities,although the satellite itself is only one part of the system that can be attacked.Offensiv

208、e capabilities can be used to deceive,disrupt,deny,degrade,or destroy any of the three elements of a space system:the satellite,the ground system,or the communication links between them.A key driver in the proliferation of offensive counterspace capabilities is the increased use of space capabilitie

209、s to support conventional warfare.For much of the Cold War,space was limited to mainly a strategic role in collecting strategic intelligence,enforcing arms control treaties,and warning of potential nuclear attacks.Although the Cold War saw significant development and testing of counterspace capabili

210、ties,the close link between space capabilities and nuclear war provided a level of deterrence against actual attacks on space systems.However,over the last three decades,many of these strategic space capabilities have found new roles by directly supporting conventional wars by I N T R O D U C T IO N

211、xxxviiiSECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/2024providing operational and tactical benefits to militaries.This has increased the incentives for countries to develop offensive counterspace capabilities,while also decreasing the deterrent value of the nuclear link.While there are undeniable military benefits to

212、 these new uses of space,there are risks as well.First,the growing reliance on space for national security and the proliferation of counterspace capabilities creates an increased risk that incidents in space can spark or escalate conflict on Earth.The sudden loss or interruption of space capabilitie

213、s during a period of heightened geopolitical tensions could create the assumption that it is the opening salvo of an armed attack,even if it was a natural event or an onboard failure.Second,the actual use of offensive counterspace capabilities could have long-lasting consequences for humanity,whethe

214、r through the loss of critical space capabilities that underpin the global economy and societies or through the creation of long-lived space debris that hinders future space activities.To help address this issue,Secure World Foundation began a project in the summer of 2017 to develop an open-source

215、assessment of global counterspace capabilities.We convened a group of international experts to work withour staff to compile publicly available information on the development of counterspace capabilities by several countries.We decided to examine five distinct categories of offensive counterspace ca

216、pabilities:Direct Ascent:weapons that use ground,air-,or sea-launched missiles with interceptors that are used to kinetically destroy satellites through force of impact,but are not placed into orbit themselves;Co-orbital:weapons that are placed into orbit and then maneuver to approach the target to

217、attack it by various means,including destructive and non-destructive;Directed Energy:weapons that use focused energy,such as laser,particle,or microwave beams to interfere or destroy space systems;Electronic Warfare:weapons that use radio frequency energy to interfere with or jam the communications

218、to or from satellites;Cyber:weapons that use software and network techniques to compromise,control,interfere,or destroy computer systems.In the 2020 edition,we added space situational awareness(SSA)as a separate category for each of the countries included in the report.SSA is defined as knowledge ab

219、out the space environment and human space activities and generally includes detection,tracking and characterization of space objects,and space weather monitoring and prediction.While SSA is not uniquely used for counterspace,it is a critical enabler for both offensive and defensive counterspace oper

220、ations.In some countries,the national security version of SSA is known as Space Domain Awareness(SDA),with an added emphasis on detecting and characterizing threats.For each of these categories,we assessed what the current and near-term capabilities might be for the countries examined in this report

221、,based on the publicly available information.We also assessed the potential military utility for each capability,which includes both the advantages and disadvantages of thecapabilities.Finally,when possible,we examined each countrys policy,doctrine,and budget to support the offensive counterspace ca

222、pabilities being developed.Taken together,this analysis is intended to provide a more holistic picture of xxxixGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES what each country is working on and how these capabilities may be used.This edition has been updated to include events through February 2024.All cataloged s

223、pace objects mentioned in this report are described by three separate identifiers.The first identifier is the public name of the space object as determined by official reports or documents.The second identifier is the international designator,a unique code established by the Committee on Space Resea

224、rch(COSPAR)of the International Council for Science,and consisting of the year of launch,a three-digit incrementing launch number of that year,and up to a three-letter code representing the sequential identifier of a piece in a launch.The third identifier is the unique number assigned to the object

225、by the US military in its public satellite catalog,often referred to as the satellite number or satno,which increments by one for each new object cataloged.In this text,the first mention of a space object will include all three identifiers in the format (international designator,satno).Further menti

226、ons will include only the public name if it is known or the catalog number if the public name is not known.The countries we chose to examine in this report are the ones most active in developing their own indigenous offensive counterspace capabilities and for which there is public evidence of these

227、efforts.However,they should not betaken as an exhaustive list of countries doing so.Some of the capabilities,such as cyber or DEW,are difficult to observe while in development and could be much more widely proliferated than indicated herein this report.It is likely,however,that the types of counters

228、pace capabilities being developed by other countries are similar to those discussed in this report.Many of the details contained in this report will not be new to the government experts who have been analyzing these same trends.In fact,we hope that much of our work replicates theirs.However,since mu

229、ch of the government work on these issues is classified or otherwise not divulged to the public,the assessment presented in this report is likely to be new to those who do not have active security clearances.We hope that it provides useful context to the soundbites and headlines being generated over

230、 military and political leaders concerns about counterspace and space superiority.Finally,while we have strived to make this report as unbiased and accurate as possible,like all analytical products,it should be read with a degree of skepticism.A significant degree of judgment was used in determining

231、 which sources of information to include in this report,and how to weigh their impact on the overall assessment.Many of the sources themselves are flawed in that they originate from media reports that similarly are the product of individual judgment about what to report,or not to report.Wherever pos

232、sible,we tried to include the lowest level of reference for the information presented here so that the reader can bring their own judgment to bear.In 2022,we did a major restructuring to better highlight the scope of different countries counterspace activities.The report is now divided into three ma

233、in sections.Section 1 includes countries that have conducted destructive ASAT tests in space,in chronological order by year of their first test,and ends with an assessment of the space debris created by these tests.Section 2 includes countries that have significant counterspace R&D programs but have

234、 not yet done a destructive test.Section 3 focuses on cyber capabilities,given that they are exceedingly difficult to assess on a per-country level based on open-source data.Finally,the report includes two Appendices:one with tables of historical ASAT testing in space,and a second with satellite ima

235、gery of major launch,testing,and other facilities discussed in the report.GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES Countries That HaveConducted DestructiveASAT TestsGLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES T H E U N IT E D S T AT E S0177.0369W38.9072N01-0101020304050607080910111213141516GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILI

236、TIES The United States currently has the most advanced military space capabilities in the world although the relative gap with China is narrowing.During the Cold War,the United States pioneered many of the national security space applications that are in use today and remains the technology leader i

237、n nearly all categories.The US military also has the most operational experience of any military in the world in integrating space capabilities into military operations,having done so in every conflict since the 1991 Persian Gulf War against Iraq.During the Cold War,the United States,like the Soviet

238、 Union,had multiple counterspace programs,ranging from nuclear-tipped missiles to conventional DA-ASATs launched from fighter jets.Most of these programs were to counter specific Soviet military space capabilities,such as the ability to use satellites to target US Navy ships with anti-ship missiles.

239、After the fall of the Soviet Union,the United States briefly considered pushing ahead and developing new counterspace systems to solidify its space superiority.However,these efforts never fully materialized due to a range of factors,including domestic budgetary and political pressure,deliberate self

240、-restraint,and the focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.Today,the United States fields one acknowledged counterspace system that uses electronic warfare capabilities to interfere with satellite signals,but it also has multiple other operation

241、al systems that could be used in counterspace roles.The United States is likely developing new offensive counterspace capabilities,to deny an adversary their own space capabilities in the event of a future conflict,although these are unlikely to be destructive in nature.The impetus for this is renew

242、ed Russian and Chinese space and counterspace developments and the recent conclusion that the United States is engaged in great power competition with Russia and China.The United States has also undertaken a major reorganization of its military space capabilities by creating a separate military serv

243、ice,the US Space Force,and combatant command,US Space Command,dedicated to space.The following sections summarize US counterspace development across co-orbital,direct ascent,directed energy,electronic warfare,and spacesituational awareness categories,along with a summary of US policy and doctrine on

244、 counterspace.1.1 US CO-ORBITAL ASATAssessment/The United States has conducted multiple tests of technologies for closeapproach and rendezvous in both LEO and GEO,along with tracking,targeting,and hit-to-kill(HTK)intercept technologies that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability.These tests and

245、demonstrations were conducted for other non-offensive missions,such as missile defense,on-orbit inspections,and satellite servicing,and the United States does not have an acknowledged program to develop offensive co-orbital capabilities.However,the United States possesses the technological capabilit

246、y to develop a co-orbital capability in a short period of time if it chooses to.SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/20240102030405060708091011121314151601-02Specifics/Although the United States never had an operational co-orbital ASAT program during the Cold War,it has had proposals for such a program and di

247、d test and develop many of the underlying technologies.Most notably,several of the technologies for space-based ballistic missile intercept developed as part of SDI during the 1980s could have been used to intercept satellites as well.Project SAINTProject SAINT(also known as the Satellite Inspector

248、Program)was a USAFeffort to develop a system that could be used initially as a satellite inspector but could be turned into a co-orbital ASAT weapon.The concept began because of a set of studies done from 1956 through 1959 on ways to defend against hostile satellites.1 Following those studies,the US

249、AF developed initial ideas for three different concepts:one that was uncrewed and ground-launched,one that was uncrewed and air-launched,and a third that was crewed.In 1960,the USAF pressed forward with a“satellite inspector”version of the program in response to concerns about an unidentified space

250、object that was detected in December 1959(that later turned out to be a piece of debris from the US Discoverer V satellite).2 The inspector concept called for the SAINT vehicle to be launched into orbit on an Atlas booster,after which it would match orbits with the target and use onboard television

251、cameras and radars to inspect the target from as close as 50 feet.However,the USAF also hoped that a later version of the SAINT vehicle would include a kill mechanism,such as high-explosive rockets.The USAF planned for an initial set of four intercept tests beginning in 1963 and for SAINT to be full

252、y operational by the summer of 1967.3 However,lack of budget support and political concerns led to the programs cancellation in 1962,before any on-orbit tests were conducted.Delta 180Although not explicitly designed as a co-orbital ASAT weapon,the United States did conduct a successful co-orbital in

253、tercept during the Delta 180 experiment as part of the SDI.The goal of the Delta 180 experiment was to better understand tracking,guidance,and control for a space intercept of an accelerating target.4 The experiment involved modifying the second stage of a Delta 2 rocket(D2)to carry a sophisticated

254、tracking system that included laser ranging,ultraviolet,visible,and infrared sensors.The payload consisted of a McDonnell Douglas PAS(Payload Assist System)platform combined with the warhead and seeker from a Phoenix air-to-air missile and Delta 2 rocket motors.The Delta 180 rocket was launched from

255、 the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station(CCAFS)on September 5,1986,and two objects(Delta 1 R/B,1986-069B,16938;USA 19,1986-069A,16937),presumably the D2 and PAS,respectively,were placed into a 220 km circular orbit.The PAS maneuvered to a separation distance of 200 km,and 90 minutes after launch,the D2

256、 observed the launch of an Aries rocket from White Sands Missile Range.At 205 minutes after launch,the D2 and PAS both ignited their engines on an intercept course,colliding at a combined speed of nearly 3 km/s.5 Sixteen pieces of orbital debris from the collision were cataloged with apogees as high

257、 as 2,300 km.Due to the low altitude of the intercept,most of the pieces reentered the atmosphere within two months.The final piece of debrisreentered on April 4,1987,more than seven months after the test.1 Paul Stares,The Militarization of Space:U.S.Policy,1945-1984,Cornell University Press,August

258、1,1985,pp.112.2 Ibid,p.112-113.3 Ibid,p.115.4 John Dassoulas and Michael D.Griffin,“The Creation of the Delta 180 Program and Its Follow-ons,”Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest,vol.11,Numbers 1 and 2(1990):p.86,https:/www.jhuapl.edu/Content/techdigest/pdf/V11-N1-2/11-01-Dassoulas.pdf.5“VSE(Delta-180

259、,DM-43),”Gunters Space Page,accessed March 22,2018,http:/space.skyrock-et.de/doc_sdat/vse.htm.01-0301020304050607080910111213141516GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES Recent US LEO RPO ActivitiesSince the end of the Cold War,the USAF,National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA),Defense Advanced

260、Research Projects Agency(DARPA),and other US government agencies have all conducted tests and demonstrations of close approach and rendezvous technologies in LEO.On January 29,2003,the USAF launched the XSS-10(2003-005B,27664)as a secondary payload on a Delta-2 rocket carrying a US military GPS sate

261、llite.After the GPS satellite was deployed and the Delta upper stage(203-005C,27665)conducted its passivationburns,the XSS-10 was released.It then conducted a pre-planned series of RPO maneuvers near the Delta upper stage,eventually closing to within 50 m.6 XSS-11(2005-011A,28636)was launched on Apr

262、il 11,2005,and according to the official fact sheet,proceeded to“successfully demonstrate rendezvous and proximity operations with the expended rocket body that placed it in orbit.”7 The fact sheet also stated that over the following 12 to 18 months,the spacecraft“conducted rendezvous and proximity

263、maneuvers with several US owned,dead or inactive resident space objects near its orbit.”However,it is impossible to verify whether these activities occurred and whether XSS-11 visited any non-US space objects because the US military did not publish any positional information for the XSS-11 while in

264、orbit.FIGURE 1-1 MINOTAUR UPPER STAGEThe image was taken by XSS-11 from a distance of approximately 500 m.Image credit:AFRL.8On April 15,2005,NASA launched the DART satellite(2005-014A,28642)to conduct an autonomous rendezvous experiment with a US Navycommunications satellite,the MUBLCOM satellite(1

265、999-026B,25736).DART ended up“bumping”into MUBLCOM during the test,and although bothsatellites were apparently unharmed,the public version of NASAs mishap report lacks details as to why the collision happened.9DARPA also conducted a demonstration of close approach and rendezvous technology in the co

266、ntext of satellite servicing with its Orbital Expressmission.Orbital Express consisted of two spacecraft,the ASTRO servicingvehicle(2007-006A,30772)and the NEXTSat client vehicle(2006-006C,30774).On March 8,2007,the two spacecraft were launched from CCAFS on an Atlas V rocket and placed into a rough

267、ly 500 km circular orbit.After checkout,the ASTRO demonstrated the ability to autonomously transfer fluid to NEXTSat and use a robotic arm to swap out components.The two spacecraft then6 Thomas M.Davis and David Melanson,“XSS-10 Micro-Satellite Flight Demonstration,”Paper No.GT-SSEC.D.3:p.7.https:/s

268、martech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/8036/SSEC_SD3_doc.pdf;jsessionid=906BB-52FE69F848048883B704DB20F07.smart2?se-quence=2.7“XSS-11 Micro Satellite,”Fact Sheet:Air Force Research Laboratory,Space Vehicles Director-ate,current as of September 2011,accessed March 22,2018,p.1,http:/www.kirtland.af.

269、mil/Portals/52/documents/AFD-111103-035.pdf?ver=2016-06-28-110256-797.8 Ibid,p.2.9“Overview of the DART Mishap Investigation Results,”NASA,accessed March 22,2018,http:/www.nasa.gov/pdf/148072main_DART_mishap_overview.pdf.SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION 04/20240102030405060708091011121314151601-04separated a

270、nd spent the next few months demonstrating multiple rendezvous and capture scenarios,including the first-ever use of a robotic arm toautonomously capture another space object.10 The two spacecraft weredeactivated in July 2007.11FIGURE 1-2 ORBITAL EXPRESS MISSION PLANImage credit:Boeing.12X-37B Robot

271、ic SpaceplaneThe X-37B is a reusable robotic spacecraft that serves as a technologydemonstrator and experimental vehicle.It is launched into orbit on a SLV,can stay in orbit for an extended period of time,and then glide to a runwaylanding.13 The original X-37A was developed by NASA and derived from

272、SpaceShuttle concepts before transfer to DARPA in 2004.In 2006,the USAF tookover the program and developed a new version,the X-37B,and produced twospacecraft known as Orbital Test Vehicles(OTVs)that have since flown sevenmissions,likely for testing new reusable space launch vehicle technologies(such

273、 as guidance and thermal protection)and on-orbit testing of new sensortechnologies and satellite hardware for risk reduction.On October 27,2019,the OTV-5 flight of the X-37B completed an at that time record-breaking 780-day stay in orbit with a landing at NASAs Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing F

274、acility.In a press release,the director of the Rapid Capabilities Office stated that as part of its mission it had provided a ride for small satellites.14 Although a similar reference was made during the launch of OTV-5 in September 2017,it was perceived at that time to be small satellite ride share

275、s that would be attached to the upper stage of the Falcon 9 booster that placed it into orbit,as has been done on previous launches.However,no such deployment was announced nor cataloged by the US military after the launch of OTV-5,leading to the conclusion that the deployment must haveoccurred from

276、 the X-37B itself later in the mission.On February 11,2020,the US military cataloged three new satellitesUSA 295(45169,2017-052C),USA 296(45170,2017-052D),and USA 297(45171,2017-052E)associated with OTV-5.However,no orbital information was provided for those three satellites.On February 12,the catal

277、og was updated to reflect that they were no longer in orbit.An analysis done by Dr.Marco Langbroek suggests the three cubesats had to be deployed before August 2018 if they were of 3U size.1510“Orbital Express Mission Updates,”Boeing,Defense,Space&Security PhantomWorks,accessed March 22,2018,https:/

278、web.archive.org/web/20121017163534/http:/ Stephen Clark,“In-space Satellite Servicing Tests Come to an End,”SpaceFlight Now,July 4,2007,http:/ Express:Testing On-Orbit Servicing,”Defense Industry Daily,April 19,2007,https:/ Stephen Clark,“Air Force spaceplane is an odd bird with a twisted past,”Spac

279、eflight Now,April 2,2010,https:/ Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs,“X-37B Breaks Record,Lands After 780 Days In Orbit,”United States Air Force,October 27,2019,https:/www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Arti-cle/1999734/x-37b-breaks-record-lands-after-780-days-in-orbit/.15 Marco Langbroek,“Launch

280、ing Cubesats From the X-37B OTV 5:Lifetime Modelling With GMAT,”SatTrackCam Leiden(b)log,February 21,2020,https:/sattrackcam.blog- COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES The next launch of the X-37B was OTV-6(2020-029A,45606)in May 2020,carrying for the first time a new service module at its end that would give

281、it more room for payloads and experiments;one of which was a satellite,FalconSAT 8,built by students at the USAF Academy,and was deployed in October 2021.16 OTV-6 released another subsatellite at the end of May 2020,which was cataloged by the US military as USA 300(2020-029B,45610)indicating it was

282、another separate payload.17 OTV-6 also tested an on-orbit power beaming system,the US Naval Research Laboratory(NRL)s Photovoltaic Radio-frequency Antenna Module(PRAM),that collected solar power and transformed it into a microwave beam.This was the first test of such capabilities in space and could

283、eventually lead to large-scale space-based solar power,but could also provide offensive DEW counterspace capabilities.18 OTV-6 also carried NASA payloads that did not separate,including Materials Exposure and Technology Innovation in Space(METIS-2),which tested candidate radiation shielding material

284、s,printed electronic materials,and thermal control coatings;METIS-1had been on OTV-5.19 Boeing and SpaceX later released a video showing the X-37B and its payload module separating from the launch rocket.20 Russian reports claimed that the X-37B released a small object in October 2021,which spent a

285、day keeping about 200 meters away from the object,and then moved away from it.21 The US militarys public satellite catalog lists an additional object associated with the launch as USA 299 DEB(54246,2020-029D)but has not provided orbital data for any objects associated with OTV-6 before it returned t

286、o Earth.OTV-6 landed in November 2022 after spending 908 days in orbit,which was a new record for the X-37B.22 The service module separated from the plane prior to landing and is thought to have burned up in the Earths atmosphere during reentry;Secretary of Air Force Frank Kendall pointedly stated,“

287、The deliberate manner in which we conduct on-orbit operations to include the service module disposal speaks to the United States commitment to safe and responsible space practices,particularly as the issue of growing orbital debris threatens to impact global space operations.”23The most recent X-37B

288、 mission is OTV-7(USA 349,2023-210A,58666),which was launched in December 2023 after being delayed twice,first due to weather,and then second because of ground equipment issues.24 USSF officials said prior to the launch that tests of the X-37B would include“operating the reusable spaceplane in new o

289、rbital regimes,experimenting with future space domain awareness technologies,and investigating the radiation effects on materials provided by NASA.”25 It was spotted by an amateur astronomer in February 2024 in a HEO of 323 x 38,838 km x 59.1 deg inclination,26 which is significantly higher than ear

290、lier test flights(which stayed well within LEO)and also distinct from other well-known HEO missions,such as the Soviet/Russian Molniya satellites.16 Stephen Clark,“Upgraded X-37B spaceplane rockets into orbit aboard Atlas 5 launcher,”S,May 17,2020,https:/ Jonathan McDowell,Tweet,May 30,2020,https:/

291、Joseph Trevithick,“X-37Bs Power Beaming Pay-load A Reminder Of Potential Orbital Microwave Anti-Satellite Weapons,”TheD,May 19,2020,https:/ Thomas Newdick,“Details About X-37B Payload Adapter Revealed After Record-Setting Mission,”The War Zone,November 14,2022,https:/ Joseph Trevithick,“Look At An X

292、-37B In Space With An Extended Payload Module,”The War Zone,December 29,2023,https:/ Dmitry Stefanovich,Twitter,December 8,2021,https:/ Kozin,“Cold Star War:The US has Questions for Moscow about Space,Russia has even more Questions for the US,”VKP-News,November 29,2021,https:/vpk-news.ru/articles/64

293、859.22 Stefano DUrso and David Cenciotti,“Reflecting On The X-37Bs Latest Record-Breaking Mission,”The Aviationist,December 24,2022,https:/ Newdick,ibid.24 Mike Wall,“SpaceX Falcon Heavy rocket launch-es mysterious X-37B space plane for US Space Force after delays,”S,December 28,2023,https:/ of the

294、Air Force scheduled to launch seventh X-37B mission,”Air Force News Service,November 8,2023,https:/www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3583347/department-of-the-air-force-scheduled-to-launch-seventh-x-37b-mission/.26 Jonathan McDowell,“Congrats to Tomi Simola for locating the secret X-37

295、B spaceplane.OTV 7 is in a 323 x 38838 km x 59.1 deg orbit.Could be testing out a new HEO IR sensor for future early warning satellites-just a wild speculation on my part here.”,Posted on Twitter,February 9,2024,https:/ WORLD FOUNDATION 04/20240102030405060708091011121314151601-06FIGURE 1-3 X-37B OT

296、V 7 HIGHLY ELLIPTICAL ORBITImage credit:Marco Langbroek.27The mission of the X-37B has long been a source of mystery and speculation.While the USAF has acknowledged the existence of the X-37B program and announced launches and landings,it has been secretive about the mission of the X-37B and its loc

297、ation and activities while on orbit.Officially,the USAF has stated that the X-37B is a platform for testing new technologies and operational concepts.28 However,the secrecy has led to a huge amount of speculation,particularly by Russia and China,that the X-37B is some sort of orbital bomber or secre

298、t weapons testing platform.Not helping calm concerns about its mission was the release of the USSFs first official painting in October 2023,which showed a military space plane described only as a“futuristic intercept vehicle”getting ready to engage with an enemy satellite;the USSF stated that they h

299、ad the artist“rely on historic space planes and his own imagination”for the painting.29 Complicating things further is that the USSFs Space Delta 9 is now responsible for overseeing the X-37Bs operations once it is in orbit.Space Delta 9“conducts protect and defend operations from space and provides

300、 response options to deter and defeat adversary threats in space.”30 Analyzing the known facts about the size,shape,and orbit of the X-37Bprovides a more useful answer.The spaceplane resembles the now-retired space shuttle orbiter in overall shape but is much smaller,completely robotic,and as initia

301、lly designed,has a payload bay that is roughly the size of a pickup truck bed.31 The ring-shaped service module added for OTV-6 does increase what it can carry.However,it still has a limited ability to host weapons,and its limited gliding capability and maneuverability makes it not militarily useful

302、 as an orbital bomber.32 Based on tracking data from hobbyists,the X-37B historically orbits between 300 and 400 km and at inclinations between 38 and 54 degrees with a ground track that repeats every few days.This strongly indicates a likely remote sensing mission,perhaps by flight testing new payl

303、oads.Given the most recent OTV-7 mission is in a much higher altitude of nearly 39,000 km,it is possible it is testing out a new type of sensor or payload,but it is unclear what kind or why.While it likely has substantive maneuvering capability,to date,the X-37B has not approached nor rendezvoused w

304、ith any other space objects.The secret deployment of multiple small satellites raises additional questions about the mission of the X-37B.It suggests that the X-37B may have a mission to serve as a covert satellite deployment platform.The secrecy surrounding both the X-37B and the deployment may ind

305、icate they are part of a covert intelligence27 Marco Langbroek,“Imaging the X-37B robotic spaceplane mission OTV-7,”SatTrackCam Leiden(b)log,February 13,2024,https:/ Orbital Test Vehicle,”United States Air Force,September 1,2018,https:/www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Arti-cle/104539/x-37b-or

306、bital-test-vehicle/.29 Brett Tingley,“US Space Forces 1st official painting shows military space plane intercept-ing adversary satellite,”S,October 24,2023,https:/ Joseph Trevithick,“Space Force Has A Unit Ded-icated To Orbital Warfare That Now Operates The X-37B Spaceplane,”TheD,Oct.30,2020,https:/

307、 Tyler Rogoway,“This Is Our First Look At The Secretive X-37B Spaceplane With Its Cargo Bay Doors Open,”TheD,Sept.15,2020,https:/ Brian Weeden,“X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle Fact Sheet,”Secure World Foundation,June 1,2017,https:/swfound.org/media/206982/swf_x-37b_otv_fact_sheet.pdf.01-07010203040506070

308、80910111213141516GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES program,but it may also indicate the testing of offensive technologies orcapabilities.The failure to even catalog the deployed satellitessomething that isdone even for classified US military and intelligence satellitescalls into questionthe trustwort

309、hiness of the public SSA data provided by the US military.However,similar behavior in terms of secret deployments has also been seen by the Chinese Shenlong spaceplane(see Chinese Co-Orbital ASAT,Section 3.1).Recent US GEO RPO ActivitiesThe United States has also conducted multiple close approach an

310、d proximity operations in GEO.The earliest known example is a satellite reportedly called Prowler.Based on publicly available data,satellite observer Ted Molczanconcluded that Prowler was secretly launched from a Space Shuttle missionin 1990,33 and matched the description given in a 2004 NBC news ar

311、ticle about a classified US government satellite program that had run afoul of Congress.34 The satellite had reportedly maneuvered close to multiple Russian geosynchronous orbit(GSO)satellites to collect intelligence on theircharacteristics and capabilities,and utilized stealth technologies to remai

312、n undetected by Russian optical space surveillance systems.To this day,the United States has never officially acknowledged the existence of Prowler and lists it as an extra rocket body from the Shuttle launch in its public satellite catalog.While Prowler is thought to have been decommissioned in aro

313、und 1998,it was followed by programs designed for similar missions.In 2006,the USAF launched two small satellites into GSO,officially designated as Micro-satellite Technology Experiment(USA 187,2006-024A,29240;USA 188,2004-024B,29241),with the official mission to identify,integrate,test,and evaluate

314、 small satellite technologies to support and enhance future US space missions.35 Observers speculated that the MiTEx satellites would be conducting RPO in GSO.36 In 2009,news reports revealed that they had been used to conduct“flybys”of the US early-warning satellite DSP 23,which had mysteriously fa

315、iled on orbit shortly after launch.37 Observations from hobbyists noted that the two MiTEx satellites maneuvered from their parking slots in GSO to drift towards the location of DSP 23,passing it around December 23,2009,and January 1,2010.A classified satellite publicly known only as PAN(USA 207,200

316、9-047A),was launched on September 8,2009,into GEO orbit,where it was observed relocating every six months or so,until late 2013;its nine moves over four years placed it near several other satellites.38 Then it stayed in a stable position until roughly February 2021,when it appears to have started mo

317、ving again.39 Amateur observers were able to observe it again starting in August 2023,station-keeping at 39.7 degrees East,so it is assumed that it is still active.40 In September 2023,it was spotted drifting westward.41 As of December 2023,it was seen very near the satellite EXPRESS AMU-1 but still

318、 drifting westward.42 Very little is known about the mission of PAN,although most public observers believe it has a signals intelligence mission and could be conducting similar activities to the Russian Luch/Olymp-K satellite(see Russian Co-Orbital ASAT,Chapter 2.1).In recent years,the USAF appears

319、to have applied the lessons it learned with Prowler and MiTEx to an operational program known as the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program(GSSAP),which may have the internal codename of Hornet.GSSAP consists of multiple pairs of small satellites deployed in near-GEO orbits,with altitude

320、s slightly above or below the GSO belt,which allow them to drift east or west relative to other GSO satellites 33 Ted Molczan,“Unknown GEO Object 2000-653A/90007 Identified as Prowler,”January 21,2011,p.12,http:/satobs.org/seesat_ref/STS_38/Unknown_GEO_Ob-ject_2000-653A_-_90007_Identified_as_ Prowle

321、r.pdf.34 Robert Windrem,“What is Americas Top-Secret Spy Program?Experts Think Democrats Object-ed to Satellite Weapon,”NBC News,December 9,2004,http:/ Justin Ray,“Experimental Military Microsatel-lites Reach Orbit,”Spaceflight Now,June 22,2006,https:/ Ryan Caron,“Mysterious Microsatellites in GEO:i

322、s MiTEx a Possible Anti-Satellite Capability Demonstration?”TheSpaceR,July 31,2006,http:/ Brian Weeden,“The Ongoing Saga of DSP Flight 23,”TheSpaceR,January 19,2009,p.1,http:/ Marco Langbroek,“A NEMESIS in the Sky:PAN,MENTOR 4,and Close Encounters of the SIGINT Kind,”TheSpaceR,October 31,2016,https:

323、/ Marco Langbroek,“PAN(NEMESIS 1)is on the Move Again,”SatTrackCam Leiden Blog,September 14,2021,https:/ Marco Langbroek,“Recovering USA 310,PAN and Trumpet 2,”SatTrackCam Leiden Blog,Sep-tember 10,2023,https:/ Marco Langbroek,“PAN is on the move again,”SatTrackCam Leiden Blog,September 16,2023 http

324、s:/ Marco Langbroek,Posted on Twitter,December 19,2023,https:/ WORLD FOUNDATION 04/20240102030405060708091011121314151601-08and provide close inspections of objects in the GEO region.43 The official USAF fact sheet states that the GSSAP satellites can conduct RPO of“resident space objects of interes

325、t.”44 The first pair of GSSAP satellites(USA 253,2014-043A;USA 254,2014-043B)was launched on July 28,2014,and the second pair(USA 270,2016-052A;USA 271,2016-052B)on August 19,2016,both times on a Delta 4 rocket from CCAFS.A third pair(USA 324,2022-006A,51280;USA 325,2022-006B,51281),was launched in

326、January 2022.45 The US Space Systems Command confirmed in August 2023 that one of the satellites from the pair launched in 2014,GSSAP Space Vehicle(SV)2,had reached its end of life and been placed in a graveyard orbit.46 Two more launches of new GSSAP satellites are planned to occur in 2024 and 2027

327、.47 Very limited public information is known about the on-orbit activities of the five remaining GSSAP satellites,as the USAF does not disclose information on their orbits;they are thoughtto operate in pairs,with one satellite staying below the GEO belt,and one operating above it.48 The GSSAP satell

328、ites are operated by the 1st SpaceOperations Squadron of the USSFs Space Delta 9,which has a mission to conduct orbital warfare.49On September 18,2015,General John E.Hyten,then Commander of AFSPC,remarked at a public forum that the two GSSAP satellites had been“pressed into early service”to provide

329、information to an un-named customer.50 According to General Hyten,the two satellites provided what he deemed“eye-watering”pictures of one or more objects in GSO.FIGURE 1-4 GSSAP SATELLITESArtists depiction.Image credit:US Air Force.51Although the US military did not initially provide any public data

330、 on the locations or maneuvers of the GSSAP satellites,other sources of tracking data show they are very active in the GEO region.Data collected by the ISON space surveillance network,managed by the Russian Academy of Sciences,indicates that the GSSAP satellites have conducted hundreds of maneuvers

331、since 2014 and have conducted close approaches or proximity operations of more than a dozen operational satellites in GEO,as summarized in Table 1-1.The GSSAP satellites have done close approaches of several US military satellites,several Russian and Chinese military satellites,and commercial satell

332、ites built by China and operated by other countries.According to Russian sources,some of these close approaches involved the GSSAP satellite making many small phasing 43 Amy Butler,“USAF Reveals Sats to Offer Un-precedented Space Intel,”Aviation Week&Space Technology,March 3,2004,http:/ Space Situat

333、ional Awareness Program,”USAF Fact Sheet,March 22,2017,http:/www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/730802/geosynchronous-space-situa-tional-awareness-program-gssap/.45“GSSAP 1,2,3,4,5,6,”Gunters Space Page,ac-cessed March 22,2018,http:/space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/gssap-1.htm;Theresa Hitchens,“Space Force to loft 2 new neighborhood watch sats,as leader frets launch funds,”BreakingDefense,Ja